Relativism is the theory that the truth is different for different people (not just that different people believe different things to be true). Ethical relativism is the theory that the truth about what is right and what is wrong is different for different people.

Perhaps the main reason why people support relativism is that they believe we should tolerate different beliefs, and even different behavior. Good for them.

BUT if tolerance is good, then it is good for everybody, not just individuals or cultures who happen to believe it is good. Belief in tolerance is not the same thing as relativism.

AND how tolerant should we be? Should we tolerate our local neighborhood arsonist, serial killer or child abuser?

Here is another question for the relativist: Is relativism true, or only relatively true? If it is absolutely, universally true, then not all truth about ethics is relative, so ethical relativism is false. If ethical relativism is only relatively true, then it is not true for those individuals or societies that do not believe in it. Our society does not believe in it, so it is false for us.

If ethical relativism is false, what should we believe? If the truth about ethics is not relative to each individual or culture, then it must be the same. At least, at a fundamental level it must be the same. The same fundamental principle, e.g. save lives whenever possible, would work differently in practice depending on the circumstances. If you believe in the power of human sacrifice, you might kill in order to save lives. So practices might vary even though basic, fundamental values or principles do not. And, of course, some people are likely to have false beliefs about right and wrong. So rejecting relativism does not mean having to pretend that moral disagreement never occurs. When it does occur, though, either the circumstances must be significantly different, or else at least one person must be wrong.

The most obvious alternative to relativism is objectivism: the theory that moral or ethical values are objective. BUT what does this mean?

The most obvious version of objectivism is Platonism, named after the ancient Greek philosopher Plato, which is the theory that values are literally objects. In some world, Plato believed, Goodness, Justice, Truth, Beauty, etc. exist as objects. They never change and they are the standard by which all things should be judged. Plato developed this theory partly in response to relativism.

BUT very few people believe this today. The contemporary philosopher J.L. Mackie said that Plato’s Forms, as they are called, are just too queer to be believed, and how could we ever know of such mysterious objects in some other world? If they are not literally here on Earth or in outer space, and we could never see them, touch them or hear them, how could they be known by us, unless we have some weird psychic or mystical powers unknown to science? This too is too queer to be believed. This is known as the argument from queerness.

[How good is Mackie’s argument? Why couldn’t queer things exist? Does his argument disprove the existence of God or miracles?]

So we have a problem. If values are not objects, how can they be objective? The early 20^th century philosopher G.E. Moore suggested that values might be objective properties of acts or people. For instance, being 6 feet tall is not an object, but it really, objectively is a property that some people have. In the same way, Moore argued, being good, or being the right thing to do, might be properties that certain people or actions really, objectively have. So it is no more relative, or just a matter of opinion, that murder is wrong than it is that Michael Jordan is over 6 feet tall.

BUT we can measure Michael Jordan (if he will let us) and prove how tall he is. We cannot ‘measure’ abortion to see whether it is ethically acceptable or not. If goodness is a property, it is not one that science recognizes. Moore agreed. He said that we know what is good or bad, right or wrong, by a power called intuition. Again, this seems too queer, too much like something from the X-Files, for most people to believe in today.

If objectivism is false, must we be relativists after all? No. The opposite of objectivism is not relativism but subjectivism: the theory that ethics is fundamentally subjective, or a matter of feeling. It is not relativism to believe in the universal statement that all ethics depends on subjective feelings. Still, subjectivism like this could be just as bad as relativism.

BUT it is possible to believe in a universal kind of subjectivism. The 18^th century Scottish philosopher David Hume believed in something like this. He believed that all people have the same basic feelings about good and bad: they approve of things that are useful or enjoyable, and they disapprove of things that are useless or unpleasant. This is subjective because it is purely a matter of feeling, but it is not relative, because every sane person feels the same way, unless they are biased.

Hume believed that asking whether something is morally or ethically good is like asking whether it is rough or smooth. Roughness is not a property recognized by science--it is purely a matter of how something feels to the touch. Still, things either are rough or smooth. Insane people, and people with damaged hands, might not be able to tell them apart, but every normal person can. Similarly, insane people or morally crippled people might not see that murder is wrong, but every normal person can.

PROBLEMS:

1. Normal people do not seem to agree on difficult issues like abortion, affirmative action, capital punishment, etc.

2. Can we define what is normal in an unbiased way?

3. According to Hume, if we woke up tomorrow and murder suddenly seemed right to everyone, then it would be right. This sounds queer, too.

These problems continue to be debated today, more than 2000 years after Plato. They can seem incredibly complicated and impossible to solve. BUT the contemporary philosopher Renford Bambrough argues that the truth is quite simple. Every one knows that it is wrong to deliberately perform useless surgery on a child without anaesthetic. So at least this is not relative, and not just subjective. Without getting involved in all the complicated arguments of Plato, Moore, Mackie and Hume, we can be sure of some basic moral truths, and we can use these as standards to appeal to when we argue about the rights and wrongs of less simple issues.