Is the Mind the Brain?
Is pain just a state of, or event in, the brain? Is a memory just a state of, or event in, the brain? Are psychological or mental states in general (beliefs, desires, thoughts, hopes, dreams, pains, sensations, memories, fears, etc.) just states of, or events in, the brain?
Some people think so, but here are some reasons for thinking otherwise:
1. A point about language: Beliefs, desires, pains, etc. are all concepts familiar to any normal speaker of the English language. We know what these mean without knowing anything about the brain. So the meanings of these terms are not objects or events in the brain.
Materialist response: the meanings of the words "mind" and "brain" might not be the same, but the objects to which they refer might be. Someone might not know the chemical composition of water, but still "water" and "H2O" refer to the same stuff.
2. A point about behavior: If someone is afraid they will behave in certain ways. They will avoid what they fear, or tremble when they see it, or run away. The same kind of thing goes for being in pain, or in love, or believing in God, or liking basketball, etc. etc. So fear, pain, love, etc. are not just things in the brain, they are, partly, matters of behavior. (Of course this behavior might be caused by things in the brain, but the cause of something is not the thing itself. I am not my parents.)
Materialist response: Fear, pain, and love might be things in the brain. Which things, though, could be partly defined by reference to the behavior they typically cause, as functionalism says. So the link with behavior is there, but so is the link with the brain.
3. A point about consciousness: it is subjective. Thomas Nagel has famously argued that we could know everything there is to know about bats and their brains without ever knowing what it is like to be a bat. If you are conscious, there is something that it is like to be you. This is what is meant by references to the subjective nature of consciousness. You can know all about the human brain without that telling you what it is like to feel pain, be in love, feel thirsty, etc. So psychology (the study of pain, love, belief, desire, etc.) cannot be reduced to neurology (the study of the brain).
Materialist response: Knowing what it is like to be an x means either simply being, or having been, an x, or else being able to describe things in a convincingly x-like way (a way, for instance, that is accepted by xs as being authentic). For instance, knowing what it is like to be a VMI cadet means being able to describe being a cadet in ways that cadets recognize as accurate. Alternatively, we could say with P. M. S. Hacker that we do know what it is like to be a bat: it is rather like what it is to be a mouse, only with wings and an in-built sonar. None of these accounts involves anything mysteriously non-physical. Nagel is so deep that he sinks.
4. A philosophical point: the defining feature of mental states (arguably) is that they are intentional. That is to say, they have some object. Belief is belief in something, desire is desire for something, ideas are about things, and so on. How could a state of the brain, or event in the brain, be in, for, or about something in this way?
Materialist response: It's all about causation. A desire for ice cream is a desire that typically causes one to seek ice cream. An idea of Paris is an idea typically caused by such things as going to Paris or watching a movie set in Paris. This is what functionalism, the "causal theory of mind," says, and it is right.
5. A point about ethics (and psychology): If psychology can be reduced to neurology then it seems there can really be no free will. All your likes, fears, hopes, beliefs, etc. are just physical things like rocks (only more complex) and are controlled by the same laws of physics as rocks are. In this case, it seems to make no sense to hold people responsible for what they do, any more than we hold rocks responsible. But if we give up on responsibility, mustn't we give up on ethics? That would be bad and seemingly (here's the psychological point) impossible.
Materialist response: The alleged psychological difficulty of believing something says nothing about its truth. David Hume has explained how we can be responsible for actions that are determined. We are responsible precisely for those actions that are caused by our own desires, values, beliefs, etc., i.e. by our own will. If Schopenhauer is right that we can do what we will but not will what we will, so what? As long as we can do as we will, we are free and responsible. Besides, we can change our will sometimes, with the use of medication and therapy, for instance, people can overcome their desire for drugs. AND if our ethics don't fit the facts, maybe we should change our ethics. Utilitarianism, for instance, offers an ethical theory in which the question of responsibility is pretty much irrelevant.
6. A point about religion: if the mind is the brain, what could the soul possibly be? Remember that the 'psych' in psychology refers to the soul. Psychologists mostly do not believe that any such thing exists, that's why they don't study it. If all we are is material (as the mind-is-the-brain theory seems to presuppose and imply) then how could there be any life after death?
Materialist response: Well, maybe religion is another thing that should change. If you really want to be religious, though, you might want to take another look at, say, the Bible. It has traditionally been interpreted dualistically, partly because of the influence of Plato. But the life to come promised in the Bible is bodily.
Brains obviously matter, but do not assume that the mind must be the brain. What else could it be?
1. A non-physical object, as Descartes believed.
2. Not any object, just a way of speaking about behavior, as Ryle seems to have believed.
3. Not any object, just an old-fashioned, superstitious myth, like the soul.
4. Not any object, and not anything else either (like time).
Some people have thought that the mind is the soul. Click here for ideas about what the soul might be.