Descartes’s Attempts to Prove that God Exists

 1. The Argument from the Innate Idea of God (3rd meditation)

At this stage in the Meditations Descartes is sure only that he is a thing that thinks, i.e. that has a mental life, including doubts, dreams, hopes, thoughts, pains, etc.  He thinks of himself as a non-physical container of ideas, beliefs, sensations, etc.  One of these ideas is the idea of God, a perfect being.  How did it get there?  There are only three possible ways to get an idea:

a) experience ("adventitiously," meaning that the idea comes into the mind from outside b) making it up by combining elements of other ideas ("factitiously," meaning that the idea is manufactured in the mind from material already there), and c) having them innately, i.e. from birth.  He has never experienced a perfect being, so a is ruled out.  He has never experienced anything perfect, so his idea of a perfect being cannot just be constructed out of parts of other ideas.  (Or: the idea of God is the idea of an infinite being, and no amount of addition of lesser ideas could ever reach infinity.)  Think of people living in darkness all their lives coming up with the idea of light--it cannot be done.  Just as light is not simply the absence of darkness, so too God is not simply the absence of limits or imperfections.  We could not generate such an idea from our own limited imaginations and experiences.  Therefore, this idea of God must be innate.  Who or what could have placed it in his mind?  Only a perfect being could create the idea of perfection (because, Descartes claims, there must be as much reality in the cause of an idea as there is in the thing that it is an idea of), therefore a perfect being must have planted this idea in his mind.  So, a perfect being, i.e. God, must exist.

 Objections:

I. Does the idea of a perfect being really exist, or is this really just empty talk?

II. Couldn’t we have made the idea up, for instance by comparing people of different levels of goodness and imagining one that would beat all others in such a competition?

III. Even if there is an innate idea of a perfect being, why must its cause be perfect?  Couldn’t it in fact be the product of evolution or chance, just as a monkey with a type-writer might happen to produce the complete works of Shakespeare?

IV. Who says this perfect being, if it exists, is God and not Allah or Zeus or Godzilla?

V. If all I know is that I am a thinking thing, that might be deceived every second by an evil demon, how do I know that what looks like a logical argument to me is not in fact a load of baloney?

VI. Couldn’t we get the idea of infinity by combining finitude (limitedness) with negation?

 2. The Cosmological Argument (3rd meditation)

I exist.  There must be some reason why I exist, or cause of my existence.  What could this be?  If I had created myself, I would know about it.  If it was my parents, or a mad scientist in a laboratory, or anything in the natural world, then what created the natural world and the laws of nature?  Nothing natural can create itself.  So there must be something beyond the natural world, something supernatural.  This is God.

 Objections:

I. Why couldn’t things just exist for no reason? 

II. Why must the supernatural creator of all things be God?

III. Why does God exist?

IV. See Argument 1, Objection V.

V.  The very existence of the world can seem to be a mystery, a wonder, or a miracle.  The cosmological argument seems to say, "No mystery.  God."  But isn't God supposed to be a mystery, to surpass human understanding?  Isn't the world a miracle, a divine mystery, from a religious point of view?  If so, then the choice is not between mysterious atheism and non-mysterious theism.  The choice is between mysteries, one atheistic and one not.  The theistic option will then not be preferable on the basis of its non-mysteriousness.  (This objection is related to Objection III above.)      

 3. The Ontological Argument (5th meditation)

The idea of God is the idea of a perfect being.  A perfect being is one that has every perfection.  Existence is a perfection.  Therefore, God has the property of existence, i.e. He exists.

 Objections:

I. There must be something wrong with this argument, because otherwise we could substitute the words ‘Bob’ and ‘50-foot walking jelly doughnut’ for ‘God’ and ‘being’, to prove the existence of a perfect 50-foot walking jelly-doughnut called Bob.  This would be ridiculous.

II. Existence is not a perfection.  Being good or eternal might be perfections, but to be good you first have to be.  Existence is a necessary prerequisite for having perfections.  It is not itself a perfection.

III. See Argument 1, Objection IV.

IV. See Argument 1, Objection V.